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Introduction 
 The 20th century was wrought with major wars, rapid democratization, and great 
power struggles.  With the advent of globalization and greater international cooperation, 
the problems of the 21st century will be more dynamic, spread across international 
borders, and require an increased international response[1].  Terrorism, famine, droughts, 
global warming, disease, water scarcity, nuclear proliferation, arms proliferation, and 
poverty all will be issues the international community will face[2].   
 Along with these issues, an epidemic of state failure seems to be beginning.  
“State failure” denotes a complete or partial erosion of state authority, creating a security 
vacuum where the state once was.  Failed states cannot control internal or external 
security, border security, provide basic services, or interact on an international level with 
other states.  This “black hole” of global politics creates a breeding ground for terrorism, 
illicit drugs and arms trade, and crime.  In an increasingly globalized world, these plagues 
quickly move across borders, affecting all states in the area.  Terrorist organizations use 
the security vacuum to their advantage, using the areas as recruitment and fund-raising 
centers, failed states thereby having a global destabilizing effect[3].  But what exactly is 
state failure? 
 State failure de facto can only occur to states.  While chiefdoms, clans, gangs, and 
organizations may rise and fall and have many similarities to states, we only concern 
ourselves with states.  A state is defined as an organization that enforces sovereignty 
through held power.  Sovereignty, however, is limited to power held by the state, which is 
primarily derived from legitimacy.  Legitimacy, or acceptance of authority, will play a 
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major role in my theory of why states fail.  A state's roles can be compartmentalized into 
four major parts: border security, internal security, public services, and international 
participation.  A state is able to control its borders, both in form of 
immigration/emigration and repelling invaders.  It can also provide security and enforce 
law within its borders through police or military force.  It provides services such as utility 
development, roads, security and safety services, and adjudication.  It can also 
participate, if it chooses, on the international stage by joining organizations like the UN, 
signing treaties, and engaging in war[4]. 
 State failure is said to be occurring when a state can no longer fulfill one or more 
of these roles.  A failed state is one that cannot control its borders, maintain internal order, 
provide internal or external security, provide basic public services, or participate 
internationally.  It is important to note that it is the ability to fulfill these roles, not 
willingness to fulfill these roles, that classifies a state as failed or not.  A failed state 
cannot fulfill all of these roles even if it wanted to[5].   
 A failed state often cannot control its borders.  Immigration and emigration aren't 
regulated and significant portions of the state aren't controlled.  The territorial boundaries 
of the state become gray and fluid.  Areas become a sort of no man's land or unruled 
Leviathan.  That is not to say that these areas are entirely unsecured, a bellum omnium 
contra omnes as Thomas Hobbes would say.  The lack of a governing body, legitimate or 
otherwise, drives individuals to their ethnic, religious, or family groups or under the wing 
of warlords or terrorist organizations.  Often times a failed state's governing body is 
restricted to a capital city or portion of territory while the rest of the state remains under a 
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different authority (or none at all.)  
 Failed states cannot maintain internal security both due to lack of authority and 
resources.  What little police force there may be is also often a source of human rights 
abuses and violence which further reduces the government's legitimacy.  The subsequent 
security vacuum leaves plenty of room for militias, warlords, drug cartels, and religious 
extremists to gain and solidify power.  If these groups are able to provide some form of 
security or rule of law, their influence likely will grow.  In the vacuum people tend to 
aggregate along ethnic, religious, or some other shared characteristic lines.  While this 
provides some security for some groups, it often leads to racial or religious tension and 
may cause genocide (e.g. Bosnia, Sudan, Chad)[6][7].   
 When a government loses its legitimacy and a state becomes weak, many public 
services often expected of a government either fall short of expectations or do not exist at 
all.  Public utilities and roads fall into disrepair, safety services vanish, social safety nets 
disappear, and courts are no longer maintained to settle disputes and prosecute crimes.  
This lack of services decreases state legitimacy, thus creating a positive feedback loop; 
weak states lack legitimacy and resources so services and security cannot be provided 
which further weakens the state and diminishes legitimacy and resources. 
 States are constantly moving closer to failure or towards stability all depending on 
a number of factors including public services provided, the existence of factionalized 
political elites, poverty rates, human rights abuses, rule of law, public trust in 
government, and state legitimacy.  At the core of these is legitimacy. 
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The Question  
 Why do states fail?  The question has attempted to be answered many times and 
even has some history in the discussion of the fall of Rome.  Rome, one of the greatest 
empires and societies to ever exist, crumbled and fell to lowly barbarians and Visigoths.  
Why did Rome fall?  Some answers were famine, inflation, low crop yields, and the 
obvious invaders.  The question remains why Rome, the greatest power on Earth at the 
time, succumbed to any one or a combination of these forces[8].  The same must be 
applied to modern states.  We might be tempted to attribute a modern state failure to 
invaders, droughts, economic conditions, or internal conflict but none of these 
sufficiently explain the root of why states fail.   
 We must ignore these explanations not only because they are insufficient, but also 
because they remove an essential element of the cause: the state.  By suggesting droughts 
or invaders or economic conditions as the cause, states and their structure are removed 
from the equation.  If droughts, invaders, or economic factors are the cause of state 
failure then it wouldn't matter whether the state was a democracy or a dictatorship, a free 
or unfree state, or a state that promotes equality or a state that fosters nepotism and 
oppression, they would be effected just the same.  If the question of why states fail is to 
be of any significance at all,  it must have an answer that can be applied and adapted to 
prevent state failure.  We care about the question because of the weight the answer might 
have in efforts to prevent future failures.  The state and its structure are of the utmost 
importance.  I take this into account and make sure to integrate the state and its structure 
into my theory. 
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Why States Fail 
 In order to study why states fail, two assumptions must first be made.  The first is 
that state failure is not a naturally occurring phenomena.  That is to say, states don't 
simply deteriorate for no reason other than existing.  If this were the case, state failure 
could just be an inevitability or natural process, free from any human control.  States are 
human creations and are controlled by people so it seems silly to think state failure could 
be anything other than a human creation due to choices made by people.  If state failure 
were natural the question of why states fail would be  irrelevant and any explanation 
would just be a mistaken attribution of cause to some characteristic of  a state or decision 
of individuals.   
 The second assumption we must make in order to study state failure is that states 
are not designed to collapse or fail.  That is, it is against their very nature to collapse or 
fail.  States' primary goal is survival and maintaining the power status quo.  It is also in 
the nature of individuals to aggregate and subject themselves to an authority of 
government per Rousseau's social contract[9].  Therefore, we must look at the structural 
causes of state failure, not at events that occur to states.  Events that occur to states do not 
explain why the state succumbed to the event and often do not help explain the mode of 
collapse.  It is for this reason that I exclude states that are conquered by greater powers or 
societies that are wiped out or collapse due to disease or massive natural disasters (e.g. 
Olmecs, Mayans, Iraq.)  
 We must ignore superficial explanations of state failure that look at events rather 
than the states themselves.  Common explanations include famine, environmental 
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changes, invaders, and economic conditions.  Just like when attempting to understand 
why Rome fell these explanations are insufficient and beg the question “why did Rome 
fall to famine/environmental changes/invaders/economic conditions?”  If it is not in a 
state's nature to fail then it should be able to withstand the occasional famine or repel 
disorganized invaders. 
 After covering these assumptions we are free to ask “why do states fail?”  The 
question is daunting, there is no doubt, and it has been attempted to be answered before.  
Ethnic conflict (Sadowski 1998), state polity (Vreeland 2008), and political economy of 
security (Morton and Bilgrin 2007) have all been studied in an attempt to define state 
failure on a more structural level.  Ethnic conflict was found to be a result rather than a 
cause of state collapse[10].  Vreeland found that anocracies with legislatures were less 
prone to civil war than even democracies, with absolute dictatorships being most prone to 
civil war[11].   Morton and Bilgrin argued that state failure is the product of colonialism 
and globalization with an emphasis on how modern imperialistic tendencies of strong 
states exacerbate the problems and conflicts in weak states[12].  I take a closer look at how 
state actions cause state failure. 
 Succinctly put, states fail due to a loss of legitimacy.  Legitimacy can be defined 
as the peoples' recognition of the government's authority and respect of it.  Therefore, 
legitimacy is the key variable that must be studied in order to describe state failure.  But 
this explanation is still superficial and insufficient as it does not explain how or why 
states lose legitimacy.  I have defined the state as having four distinct roles: border 
security, internal security, public services, and international participation.  Participating in 
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these roles gains the state legitimacy.  What these four roles represent are four conditions 
necessary for maintaining legitimacy.  The four conditions are justice, security, liberty, 
and equality. 
 Justice can be defined as maintaining a judicial system where rights can be fairly 
protected.  This legal system adjudicates disputes between parties and prosecutes 
criminals.  If the purpose of a government is the protection of rights[13] then a state must 
have some system of protecting those rights.  People have, at least to a degree, a universal 
understanding of what is fair and unfair or right and wrong, at least in a utilitarian or 
retributive sense.  A state must maintain and enforce this fairness with a justice system of 
some kind. 
 Security can be defined as protection of citizens from financial or physical harm.  
This includes both security from the threat of invasion by outside actors and internal 
security from the threat of crimes committed by fellow citizens.  It is in the same vein as 
justice in that security fulfills the role of the state to protect the rights of its citizens.  
Without state security, citizens' rights to life, liberty, and property extend only as far as 
they are able to individually defend them.  It is the duty of the state to ensure the 
protection of these rights and actively take countermeasures to eliminate threats against 
them.  A more subtle aspect of security is restraint on the part of the state.  The state often 
has the ability to neglect the right to life, liberty, and or property from its citizens.  Part of 
security must also include the state respecting these rights and not wrongly infringing 
upon them. 
 Liberty can be defined as having the opportunity to do as one wills.  A state that 
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does severely curtails the freedoms of its citizens, be it religious, individual, economic, or 
otherwise, loses legitimacy.  This is because it is an abuse of power per the social 
contract.  A government is supposed to protect rights, not be the one removing them.  
This places liberty in the same category as security and justice as they are all means of 
assuring rights and self-determination. 
 The last condition, equality, is the focus of my thesis.  Equality is not meant to 
mean equality in a social egalitarianism sense but in a political sense of equality before 
the law.  When a state unequally applies justice, security, and liberty and resources they 
are at the greatest risk of losing legitimacy and, therefore, failure.  A state may over-tax or 
sequestering property from a targeted and select group of people.  A state may also 
choose to neglect providing justice, security, and liberty to these groups, either through 
active oppression or willful neglect.  The neglected group, or out group as I will call 
them, also is often limited in participating in the government either through restricted 
voting in a democracy or lack of representation in a non-democracy.  It is this key 
condition, equality, that is the cornerstone to state legitimacy. 
 The mechanism of collapse is multifaceted, but can be explained quite easily as a 
sequence of events.  First, a state unequally applies justice, security, and liberty and 
resources and treats the out group unequally.  The out group becomes disenfranchised and 
either seeks to undermine the state's authority or turn to alternative authorities in the form 
of rebel governments, warlords, or clans.  The out group, marginalized, rarely seek to 
produce as it will likely be taken away by the state or by supporters of the state with little 
to no chance of seeking restoration of the damages.  It is for this reason that the out group 
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often turns to crime, drugs, and rebel groups as a means of restoring, at least in part, 
justice, security, and liberty to their lives.   
 Once the out group aggregates under clans, warlords, crime syndicates, or rebel 
movements the state is posed with the choice of meeting the demands of the group (per 
Vreeland 2008) or combating them.  Typically states that choose the former do not fail as 
the demands are typically equality and restoration of justice, security, and liberty.  
Occasionally the demand may be independence which forces the state to choose between 
loss of territory and population or continued conflict.  When the state chooses to continue 
to neglect the out group's demands they must combat them, thus further marginalizing the 
group.  The increased demand for military and security spending and repair of public 
utilities and decreased control and revenue, combined with increasing violence, drugs, 
and crime, all create a positive feedback loop that causes the state to lose more 
legitimacy.  And so a state fails. 
 
Case studies 
 In order to demonstrate how equal application of justice, security, and liberty and 
resources I will use a number of case studies of failed states.  The Fund For Peace's 
Failed States Index was used to determine state failure[14]. I chose the states based upon a 
number of criteria.  First, I ignored states that recently became failed due to invasion by a 
greater power or by massive natural disasters.  Next, I chose states the best embodied 
aspects of a failed state: inability to maintain border security, maintain internal security, 
provide public goods, and participate internationally.  The states I used for case studies 
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are Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly 
Zaire), and Guinea.  All ranked in the top ten failed states on the Failed States Index with 
all but Guinea ranked in the top five  at least once in the past ten years.  I will provide a 
synopsis of each states' collapse, provide a brief outlook synopsis, and then explain how 
equality is crucial to each case study. 
 
Chad 
 Chad gained its independence from France in 1960.  Francois Tombalbaye, the 
leader of the Chadian Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Tchadien, PPT) as well as a 
Christian southerner, became President.  Tombalbaye and his political bloc in the south 
had a clear dominance in the early government of Chad.  In 1962 Tombalbaye banned all 
political parties but his own, the PPT.  Gabriel Lisette, the previous leader of Chad and 
Tombalbaye's deputy prime minister in charge of economic coordination and foreign 
affairs, was banished by Tombalbaye and stripped of his citizenship.  Because of the riots 
that ensued, Tombalbaye declared a state of emergency, dissolved the National Assembly, 
and created a special criminals court, imprisoning political opponents and innocent 
citizens[15].   
 Now in complete control of government, Tombalbaye imposed a new tax on Chad 
citizens in 1964.  However, it was reported that government officials imposed taxes at 
three times the normal rate in the north and in rural central Chad.  These areas were 
dominated by Muslims and largely were uneducated.  Because of this, Tombalbaye filled 
his government with southerners.  People in the northern and central regions were often 
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oppressed and fined for reasons such as wearing turbans or having a beard[16]. 
 Antigovernment activities began to arise in the late 1960's with frequent riots in 
the northern and eastern regions.  Numerous rebel groups were formed, the most 
prominent being the National Liberation Front of Chad (Front de Libération Nationale du 
Tchad, FROLINAT.)  In order to combat FROLINAT Tombalbaye had to call on the 
French for assistance who mandated a number of liberal reforms.  Sultanate judges were 
reinstated, unpopular taxes eliminated, and political prisoners were released.  These few 
years reduced tension and conflict[17]. 
 In 1971, Tombalbaye ended reforms claiming to have crushed the rebellion.  He 
appointed a new chief of staff, Colonel Félix Malloum.  Infighting became more common 
and Tombalbaye became more unpopular has he began implementing the same policies as 
before.  Due to droughts in the 1970's, Tombalbaye had the military round up 
“volunteers” from villages to plant cotton.  Tombalbaye's political support eroded, 
members of the N'Djamena's gendarmerie killed Tombalbaye in a coup in April of 1975.   
 Félix Malloum assumed power under a military government called the Supreme 
Military Council (Conseil Supérieur Militaire, CSM.)  The few years that followed were 
marked by civil war between the CSM and various rebel groups, including FROLINAT.  
FROLINAT during this time received military assistance from Libya and other Muslim 
nations and eventually was nearly as powerful, is not more powerful than the CSM.  The 
CSM and south finally fell in 1979.  A civil war between multiple parties followed[18]. 
 Goukouni Oueddei, a FROLINAT militant supported by Libya, took control in 
1982.  That same year he was overthrown by Hissène Habré, his Prime Minister.  Habré 
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ruled autocratically, throwing political opponents in jail, often torturing them, and 
practicing ethnic cleansing, attacking the Sara, Hadjerai, and Chadian Arabs and 
Zaghawa.  In 1990 Idriss Deby, the current president, and his political allies over threw 
Oueddei[19]. 
 Deby's regime was similar to previous ones, marked by oppression of political 
opponents and corruption.  Deby's government has been known to use philanthropic 
funds meant for disaster relief for its own purposes.  Elections are considered rigged and 
the state police force publicly beats political opposition.  In the first decade of 2000, rebel 
groups continued to fight Deby forces.  The Darfur conflict in nearby Sudan spilled over 
into eastern Chad, causing refugees to flood the region and increased conflict.  In 
February 2008 fighting escalated with rebel forces attacking the capital N'Djamena with 
the support of Sudan.  Currently, fighting has died down but rebel forces and political 
opposition remain.  Chad was ranked 2nd on the Failed States Index 2011[20]. 
 Initially, hopes were high for Chad.  However, Tombalbaye's unequal application 
of justice and liberty caused the rural north and central regions.  This initial inequality 
marginalized a number of groups, decreased the legitimacy of the government and 
fostered the creation of rebel groups and alternative authorities.  Some progress was made 
in the late 1960's when Tombalbaye liberalized his policies and concessions were made, 
but his actions following 1971, as well as the actions by the leaders who followed him, 
continued the downward spiral.  Corruption is especially concerning as government 
profiteering greatly decreases trust in the government both from citizens and foreigners 
who give aid.  While blatant inequality, outside of political loyalties, has decreased under 
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Deby, Chad was already in the hole and lacking legitimacy and Deby hasn't satisfied 
enough of the conditions to rebuild legitimacy. 
 
Sudan 
 In 1956 Sudan gained its independence from the UK.  Ismail al Azhari, the leader 
of the National Umma Party of Sudan (NUP), a moderate Islamic party based in northern 
Sudan, became the national leader of the Transitional government based in the capital 
Khartoum as Prime Minister.  NUP then created the People's Democratic Party (PDP).  
The PDP and defectors of the NUP replaced Azhari with Abd Allah Khalil, also a 
northerner.  The southern Sudanese people were used to quality public goods and disliked 
the replacement of British administrators with northern Sudanese. In 1958 elections were 
held and the people elected a PDP majority to both houses.  The new parliament, due to 
corruption and factionalization, was largely ineffective in pacifying the south[21]. 
 In November 1958 a coup took place, per Khalil's direction, and Ibrahim Abbud 
assumed power creating Supreme Council of the Armed Forces as the new government of 
Sudan.  Abbud, while having some success in his first year, exacerbated tensions with the 
south by suppressing religious and cultural differences and attempted to Arabize the 
region.  Abbud also closed parliament which was used as a forum for southern 
grievances.  In 1963, southern leaders restarted the rebellion. 
 In 1964, growing dissent in the south and public sectors led to weeks of riots and 
a national strike of all public servants and students.  Khalil dissolved the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces and the leftist United National Front (UNF) party took 
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power.  They reinstated the Transitional Government and held elections in 1965.  
However, due to violence and conflict in the south and in some rural areas, elections 
could not be held everywhere.  As a result, voter turnout was low and very few candidates 
won a majority of the votes.  The result was yet another north dominated government 
under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub; “the Umma captured 75 out of 158 
parliamentary seats while its NUP ally took 52 of the remainder.” (Metz 22)  
 In-fighting led to Mahjub being replaced by Sadiq al Mahdi just to have Mahjub 
be reelected in 1967.  In 1968, because of opposition in the parliament, Mahjub 
disbanded the parliament.  This caused two governments to be acting simultaneously.  
This ended in 1969 when a coup took place and instated Jaafar an Nimeiri, a military 
officer, as chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a socialist “people's 
republic.”[22]   
  The people demanded a democratic government and government-public tensions 
significantly increased under Nimeiri.  Numerous conservative groups formed rebel 
groups to fight Nimeiri, leading to thousands of deaths and many political opposition 
leaders being exiled.  In 1971 the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) was 
formed to fight Nimeiri and to create some form of governance for southern Sudan which 
was being neglected by Nimeiri[23].   
 In 1974, numerous coup attempts due to incompetence in the Nimeiri regime and 
factionalization in Sudan led Nimeiri to declare a state of emergency.  Nimeiri 
imprisoned thousands of political dissidents and killed 700 rebels and opposition leaders.  
The decade following was marked by numerous concessions made by Nimeiri that eased 
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tensions.  However, rampant corruption and incompetence and discontent over Nimeiri's 
order that sharia be the basis of law in Sudan lead to a number of strikes in 1985.  In 
April 1985 a coup overthrew Nimeiri and instated Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab as 
the head of state with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) as the governing body of 
Sudan. 
 The people welcomed the new government which promised to end the civil war 
with the south and return power to the citizens within 12 months.  However, Dhahab was 
inept and led Sudan into bankruptcy.  Dhahab was also unable to negotiate an end to the 
civil war due to his unwaivering decision to continue subjugating the south to sharia[24].   
 Dhabab was succeeded by Sadiq al Mahdi who fell just as short as Dhahab in 
fulfilling promises.  Sadiq al Mahdi dissolved the government in 1989.  Umar Hassan 
Ahmad al Bashir, a military officer, forcefully succeeded Mahdi and established the 
Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation.  Bashir imposed sharia on the 
south and sought to end the southern rebel forces and opposition parties.  This led to an 
escalation of the civil war over the next decade. 
 The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was formed in 2003 in the south 
which led to Bashir and Islamist allied forces to ethnically cleanse areas in the south, in 
Darfur in particular.  A peace treaty was signed between the Bashir regime and southern 
rebel groups in 2005 though armed conflicts still continue to this day between the north 
based Bashir regime and southern forces[25].  On July 9th, 2011, South Sudan became a de 
facto independent country. 
 Initially Sudan began to fail when conflicts between the northern government and 
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south arose due to underrepresentation of the south.  With the excuse of rebel groups 
being present in the south, the northern based government was able to cease holding 
elections there effectively removing the south from the political process.  Rebel groups 
formed and regularly protested the north, at times rioting.  The increase in rebel groups 
and violence gave the north an excuse to crack down on political opposition by declaring 
a state of emergency.  The final straw was Nimeiri's decision to impose sharia law on the 
largely Christian and indigenous southern Sudanese people.  This oppression which was 
only made worse under Bashir fueled the civil war and collapse of Sudan.  Blatant ethnic 
cleansing by Bashir's regime destroyed any remaining legitimacy the Bashir government 
had both in the south and in non-Muslim countries.  Currently Sudan is 3rd on the Failed 
States Index[12]. 
 
Somalia 
 In 1960 British held Somaliland in the North and Italian Somaliland in the south 
gained their independence.  A pan-Somalia government was formed, unifying British and 
Italian Somaliland into the Somali republic.  The Somali people desired a unified Somalia 
but many barriers existed to integration.  The British and Italian governments left two 
completely different systems for education, taxation, policing, and governance.  Despite 
these differences a Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, and a President, Aden 
Abdullah Osman Daar, were selected and a National Assembly created.  Somalia at the 
time had three major political parties: the Somali National Congress, Somali National 
League, and the United Somali Party.  All gained some seats in the National Assembly 
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though the Northern Somali National League had disproportionately few seats[26]. 
 In October of 1969 however, then President Shermarke was assassinated by his 
body guard and a military coup d'état ensued in which the military took power under the 
leadership of Major General Mohamad Siad Barre. Barre outlawed all forms of clanism, 
nationalized nearly every industry, and made Somali the official language of Somalia.  
His regime was ruthless and had a record of human rights abuses[27].  These abuses and 
his repression of clanism lead to the rise of militias.  
 In 1991, Barre's regime was overthrown and a three-way civil war ensued. In 
2004 a couple dozen warlords and clan chiefs came to an agreement in Kenya to share 
power.  They drafted a charter which called for a Parliament of 275 members, a President, 
and a Prime Minister, and the government was to be known as the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG).  The goal was to have a temporary government regain legitimacy 
and push out other actors like the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and radical Islamists and 
separatists[28].   
 Currently, the TFG plans on having elections in August 2012 to elect a new 225 
member bicameral Parliament with a upper house of 54 Senators and a lower house. The 
TFG largely is not recognized as legitimate by the Somali people.  This is because it fails 
to provide any public services and cannot maintain security.  An Islamist militia group 
known as Al-Shabaab as well as a few other Islamist organizations continue to hold 
territory and fight TFG and African Union peacekeeping forces.  The groups are able to 
gain power by gaining legitimacy through providing some framework for adjudication 
and safety as well as the occasional public good such as building of a school or opening 
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of a port[29]. 
 Somalia likely could have been a success but was doomed since Shermarke and 
Barre.  The Southern based representatives controlled the government and 
disproportionately  developed the South and accrued wealth there.  Corruption also was 
present and enabled government officials to help their clans while neglecting many 
Northern families.  It is this unequal application of democratic principles and resources 
that caused factionalization and conflict.  Barre's regime was welcomed at first because of 
the legitimacy lost under Shermarke.  Currently, the TFG lacks legitimacy due to their 
inability to provide any public services or security and the presence of alternative 
authorities who are better suited to provide adjudication and security.  Corruption and 
nepotism are also major obstacles for the TFG.  Currently Somalia is ranked 1st on the 
Failed States Index[12]. 
 
Côte d'Ivoire 
 In October 1960 Côte d'Ivoire became an independent democracy. The 
Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI).  The PDCI, believing party competition would 
cause country disunity, took a number of steps to ensure their inability to be elected.  
Félix Houphouët-Boigny was not only the head of the PDCI but became the first 
President as well.  Côte d'Ivoire was not much of a democracy, however, as virtually all 
power resided in the presidency under Houphouët-Boigny who directed the National 
Assembly[30].   
 Because Houphouët-Boigny was moderate, a number of more conservative 
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members of his party sought to end his rule through a number of coup attempts.  This 
disunity was made worse by Côte d'Ivoire's economy consisted mainly of exports of cash 
crops such as cocoa and coffee.  This led to the government aggregating its economic and 
political development to the south in Abidjan. Students, unemployed workers, and 
unskilled laborers all were discontent with Houphouët-Boigny's rule for various reasons.   
The PDCI government crack down on protesters, causing more discontent[31].   
 Houphouët-Boigny in the 1970's allowed some dissent to be aired, mainly in 
quasi-public forums with the President, and allowed some concessions.  He still remained 
firmly in control of the country, however.  The price of of cocoa and coffee dropped 
dramatically, severely hurting the Ivorian economy, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
There was growing discontent over the economic and political conditions. In the early 
1980s student protests and strikes became more prevalent and Houphouët-Boigny crack 
downs became more severe, closing schools. 
 In 1993, Houphouët-Boigny died and Henri Konan Bédié became President.  
Bédié, like his predecessor, maintained power through restrictions placed on political 
opponents.  Bédié was overthrown in 1999 in a military coup putting General Robert 
Guéï in power.  The military allowed elections in October of 2000 and Laurent Gbagbo 
beat Guéï.  Gbagbo imposed harsh political restrictions on non-citizens, individuals 
primarily from the rural northern parts of the country.  In 2002 a short but harsh civil war 
ensued.  Gbagbo and rebel leaders sign a cease fire agreement, with a new shared 
government to hold elections in 2005.  Gbagbo however, with the support of the UN, 
extended his rule by postponing elections by a year in 2005 and again in 2006.  Gbagbo 
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was officially overtaken in an open election held in 2010, losing to Alassane Ouattara 
who forcefully took power from Gbagbo in 2011[32].   
 Numerous pro-Gbagbo forces and other rebel groups still control portions of the 
country and fight the government.  Initial disparities between north and south and 
unequal political and economic development in nearly every administration Côte d'Ivoire 
had since independence led the the rise of rebel groups, primarily in the north.  These 
groups, marginalized politically and neglected economically, took control of the rural 
north and instituted their own form of government that provided some justice and 
security for the people.  Ultimately, political turmoil due to the out groups led to the loss 
of legitimacy and Côte d'Ivoire becoming a failed state. Côte d'Ivoire is currently ranked 
10th on the Failed States Index[12]. 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
 In 1960 the Democratic Republic of Congo gained its independence from 
Belgium and appointed Patrice Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu as 
president.  Southern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, most notably 
Katanga, were underrepresented and desired to secede. Seeking to crush the secessionists, 
Katsavubu sought help from the Soviet Union.  With the support of the U.S. and other 
western powers, Joseph Mobutu led a coup[33].  
 Renaming himself Mobutu Sese Seko and the country the Democratic Republic of 
Zaire, Seko implemented an authoritarian regime.  Seko received funding from the U.S. 
and funded his military privately.  Seko's regime until 1997 was nothing but a 
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kleptocracy.  Seko used his power and international support to seize property for no 
reason, crush his political opponents and dissidents and reward those loyal to him.  
Rampant corruption and nepotism caused his regime to lose legitimacy and power, and 
led to the rise of warlords.  These warlords often used illegal exotic wood and the illegal 
diamond trade for revenue.  Tribalism became more common as the people sought 
authorities to provide them with some level of justice and security.  Rebel forces 
frequently fought Seko's forces and though territory was won and lost, Seko wasn't 
removed from power[34]. 
 In 1996 the neighboring Rwandan crisis had overflowed into the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.  Hutu militias allied with Zaire and Tutsi militias joined the rebels.  
In 1997, the rebel alliance ousted Seko and placed Laurent-Desire Kabila as the head of 
state.  Kabila dissolved the government, effectively turning the Democratic Republic of 
Congo into a state run by competing warlords[35]. 
 In 2001, Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed power.  
Kabila sought to end the war with the rebels and warlords, and in 2003 elections were 
held and a Transitional Government created.  In 2006, multiparty elections were held and 
Joseph Kabila was elected President.  Opposition forces refused to recognize the election, 
citing discrepancies in the vote.  In 2011, Kabila won a second term as President, through 
the election was widely regarded as rigged[36].   
 The Democratic Republic of Congo is a somewhat unique case.  While other 
failed states have very clear out groups, the Democratic Republic of Congo only had 
loyalists to Seko and everyone else.  The vast majority of the country opposed Seko and 
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instead pledged their support to rebel groups and warlords or tribes.  Seko's rule is an 
extreme example of how failing to meet the conditions that build legitimacy can cause a 
state to fail.  Application of the conditions was unequal, as only loyalists were protected 
and given any form of public service, though Seko loyalists constituted a minority of the 
country.  Fighting continues in the Democratic Republic of Congo and warlords still 
control a majority of the territory.  Currently the Democratic Republic of Congo is ranked 
4th on the Failed States Index.   
 
Guinea 
 Guinea achieved independence from France in 1958 and instated Ahmed Sékou 
Touré, head of the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), as President.  Touré ruled as a 
dictator, outlawing political parties and oppressing the people with no freedom of 
expression or recognition of human rights.  Touré implemented a number of a socialist 
policies that caused him to lose legitimacy. 
 Touré nationalized all land and many businesses and farms but did so 
disproportionately favoring his ethnic group Malinke.  Though Touré supported a cultural 
revolution that promoted cross-ethnic nationalism, Touré filled his regime with almost 
solely his ethnic group, Malinke[37].   By keeping other ethnicities from the political 
process and through oppression, Touré created a significant population of marginalized 
people who formed rebel groups. 
 Touré ruled until his death in 1984 when the Military Committee of National 
Recovery (CMRN) seized power.  Lansana Conte was appointed as President.  The 
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CMRN and Conte ended Touré's socialist policies and began to recognize human rights.  
In 1993 elections were held and Conte was elected as President.  There were significant 
discrepancies in the election and it was considered to be a fraud[38].   
 In the late 1990s and early 2000s revolts of military personnel and rebel groups 
became more frequent in response to the 1998 election which was rigged by Conte, 
causing Conte to crack down on dissidents[39].  A rebel group known as the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) began attacking pro-Conte villages and cities.  Conte died in 2008, 
and Moussa Dadis Camara, a military captain, led a coup and seized power.  Camara 
cracked down on dissidents and had to fend off assassination attempts, being driven out 
in 2009.   
 In 2009 a Transitional Government was put in place and in 2010 the country's first 
open elections took place.  The people elected Alpha Condé as President.  Rebel groups 
and political opposition still are prevalent.  Elections are set to take place in July of 2012 
though political opponents of Condé will likely boycott the election due to the 
expectation of government tampering with the results.   
 Guinea is a good example of how unequal application of the conditions justice, 
security, and liberty and resources cause the state to lose legitimacy and fail.  Touré's 
blatant favoritism of his ethnic group, disproportionate nationalization of non-Malinke 
ethnic groups' farms and businesses, and oppression of certain people groups created 
numerous marginalized groups which became the out group.  Rebel groups gained 
support and the state lost control over much of the country.  Currently Guinea is ranked 
11th on the Failed States Index[12]. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Simplified, my theory of why states fail is as follows: 
 
In order to study state collapse, we must assume:  
1. State collapse is not "natural".  That is to say, states don't just happen to 
fall apart over time for no reason other than existing. 
 
2. States are designed not to collapse. For this I ignore states that are 
conquered by greater powers or societies that are wiped out due to disease 
or massive natural disasters because they, for the most part, are not related 
to the structure or actions of the states. 
 
From this, we find: 
 3. A state holds power due to legitimacy.  This legitimacy can be 
 recognized by the plurality of people or a narrower, more elite group who 
 have more material or military power. 
 
4. Legitimacy is gained and maintained through ensuring the conditions of 
justice, security, liberty, and equality.  The most important of these is 
equality.  A state must equally apply justice, security, and liberty relatively 
equally to avoid creating a marginalized out group that will cause conflict, 
reducing legitimacy. 
 
5. Collapse occurs when a state loses its legitimacy. 
 
As the case studies showed, this is the generalized mode of state failure.  Future studies 
on equality in failing states and the mechanisms by which rebel groups form and 
influence the state can improve these findings.  State failure has destabilizing effects on 
neighboring countries and the international community as a whole, so it is imperative that 
we continue to look for new ways to address failed states and seek ways to remedy them. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
26 
References 
 
1. Rotberg, Robert I. The New Nature of Nation-State Failure.  The Washington 
Quarterly. Summer 2002. 
 
2. Williams, Paul D.  State Failure in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Responses. 
Africa South of the Sahara 2010. 39th Edition (Taylor & Francis: Europa World 
Yearbook, 2009), pp.21-28. 
 
3. Lambach, Daniel. Close Encounters In the Third Dimension: The Regional Effects 
of State Failure. in “State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and 
Neighborhood Effects” 2007. INEF Report 87/2007.” 
 
4. Rotberg, Robert I. Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon? 2003. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nic2020/panel2_nov6.pdf 
 
5. Ibid. 
 
6. Rotberg, Robert I. Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and 
Indicators in Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. 
2003. 
 
7. Sadowski, Yahya. Ethnic Conflict: Think Again. Foreign Policy, No. 111 
(Summer, 1998), pp. 12-23 
 
8. Tainter, Joseph A. The Collapse of Complex Societies. (New Studies in 
Archeology) Cambridge University Press; 1st Paperback Edition, 1990 edition. 
 
9. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract, Book III. 1762 
 
10. Sadowski, Yahya. Ethnic Conflict: Think Again. Foreign Policy, No. 111 
(Summer, 1998), pp. 12-23 
 
11. Vreeland, James.    The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking 
Anocracy. 2008. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (3):401-425: 
 
12. Bilgrin, Pinar and Morton, Adam.  Rethinking State Failure: The Political 
Economy of Security. in “State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and 
Neighborhood Effects” Lambach, Daniel and Debiel, Tobias (eds.) 2007. INEF 
Report 87/2007. 
 
13. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan Part II: Commonwealth 1651 
 
14. “The Failed States Index” Fund for Peace. 2005 through 2011. 
27 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=program-fsi 
 
15. Collier, John L., ed. (1990), "Historical Setting", Chad : A Country Study, Library 
of Congress Country Studies (2nd ed.), Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress 
 
16. Ibid. 
 
17. Ibid. 
 
18. Ibid. 
 
19. “Chad Profile” BBC. May 1st, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
13164690 
 
20. “The Failed States Index 2011” The Fund for Peace. 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011 
 
21. "Early History", Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Sudan A Country Study. Washington: 
GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. 
 
22. Ibid. 
 
23. Ibid. 
 
24. Ibid. 
 
25. "World Report 2011: Chad". Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/en/world-
report-2011/chad 
 
26. Helen Chapin Metz, ed. “Somalia: A Country Study.” Washington: GPO for the 
Library of Congress, 1992. 
 
27. Ibid. 
 
28. “Somalia Civil War” GlobalSecurity. 2012. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm 
 
29. “Somalia: Garowe conference comes to a close” February 19, 2012. 
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Garowe_co
nference_comes_to_a_close.shtml 
 
30. Handloff, Robert Earl (ed.) (1991), “Ivory Coast: A Country Study,” Library of 
Congress Country Studies, Washington: U.S. GPO 
 
28 
31. Ibid. 
 
32. “Ivory Coast Profile” BBC. December 21, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13287585 
 
33. “Democratic Republic of Congo profile” BBC. 2012. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13286306 
 
34. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. “The Failing State in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo” Global Dialogue Volume 13 Number 1. Winter/Spring 2011—Failed 
States 
 
35. Ibid. 
 
36. Ibid. 
 
37. Jalloh, Mohamed Pathe. “Guinea: A Historical Profile” Guiee News. 
http://www.guineenews.org 
 
38. “Guinea” CIA World Factbook. 2012. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gv.html 
 
39. “Civil War Fears in Guinea” BBC. October 23, 2000. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/986375.stm 
